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FEDERAL COURTS - DECISIONS OF STATE INTERMEDIATE COURTS AS
STATE LAW TO BE APPLIED BY FEDERAL CouRTS - The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a federal district court in Ohio was not
bound by a decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals to the effect that
in a case of wrongful transfer of shares of stock, a demand and refusal was
necessary to start the statute of limitations running. On certiorari, held, that, in
ascertaining what the state law is, lower state court decisions are data which are
not to be disregarded by a federal court, unless it is convinced by other persuasive
data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. West v. A merican Telephone & Telegraph Co., (U.S. 1940) 6r S. Ct. 179.
On the same day, the Supreme Court decided that the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit was in error in disregarding New Jersey lower
court decisions interpreting New Jersey statutes, Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Field, (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 176, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit was in error in disregarding the decision of a California
District Court of Appeal concerning liquidated damages, Six Companies of
California v. JointHighway Dist. No. I3 of California, (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct.
186.
The doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 1 requires the federal courts to
apply the substantive law of each state,2 whether this law "be declared by iti;
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision . . . ." 8 In recent
years there has been some tendency in the Supreme Court to recognize that
lower state court decisions can enunciate the state law where the highest court of
the state has not spoken,4 but some of the lower federal courts have not followed
this principle, especially when the state court has had less than state-wide juris-

304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
Sec. 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, I Stat. L. 73 at
92, 28 U.S. C. (1935), § 725, provides: "the laws of the several states, except where
the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply." In 1842, Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet.
(41 U. S.) I ( 1842), held that "laws of the several States" in this statute was limited
to state statutes, and to strictly local law, and that matters of "general law," such as
contract, tort, and commercial law should be decided independently by the federal
courts. The Erie case, in 1938, specifically overruled this interpretation.
3 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 at 78, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
4 17 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE, § 18517
(1940). In Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 5 at IO, 57 S. Ct. 330
1

2
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diction. 5 Their decisions found justification in the term "its highest court'' in the
Erie Railroad opinion, which suggests that the highest court of a state is the only
source of state law that is binding upon the federal courts. Judge Allen, in deciding the West case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,6
disregarded the decision of the Cuyahoga Circuit Court of Appeals, since this
state court had no control over the decisions in the circuit courts of appeal in
the other eighty-seven counties in Ohio, and therefore its decision did not
establish the state law. The opinions in the three principal cases, however, deny
the validity of this argument. The Court reasoned that although the Erie Railroad case held that the highest court of the state is the final arbiter of state law,
still a state is not without law save as its highest court has declared it. Where
the highest court has not passed on a question and there are lower court decisions
establishing a rule, it is the duty of the federal court to consider these decisions
as data in determining the state law.1 Application of proper state law by a
federal court amounts to a prediction of what the state supreme court would
do at the present time, since even a decision of the highest court need not be
accepted if it appears that the same decision would not be reached if the case
were now before it. 8 The federal court, in making such a prediction, should
certainly consider whether or not the state court was of state-wide jurisdiction,
but this factor should not be controlling. The reasonableness of the decision and
the ability and reputation of the judges making the decision should also be
considered.9 In a state court system where there are intermediate courts, each
(1937), the Court held, in applying local trust law to a federal tax case, that a decision
by an intermediate court in Illinois was binding on the federal court, saying: "The
decision of the state court upon these questions is final. • .• It matters not that the
decision was by an intermediate appellate court." See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
97 (1938). It has been suggested that the state court's decision in the Blair case was
followed because it was res judicata on the question before the federal court, but the
language used by the Supreme Court indicates that the decision was applied as evidence
of state law. See II TULANE L. REV. 65I (1937), commenting on the Blair case, and
contra, 88 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 487 (1940), commenting on Field v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 521.
11 See Dye, "Development of the Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,,, 5 Mo.
L. REV. 193 at 225 (1940); 17 OHIO OP. 214 (1940), noting West v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 347; 24 MINN. L.
REV. 692 (1940), noting Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1939)
108 F. (2d) 521.
6 West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 108 F.
(2d) 347•
7 " • • • it is the duty of the [federal court] in every case to ascertain from all the
available data what the state law is and apply it.••• Where an intermediate appellate
state court rests its considered judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that
is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court
unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would
decide otherwise.,, West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., (U. S. 1940) 61
S. Ct. 179 at 183.
8 "When it [the highest state court] has spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law unless it has given clear and persuasive
indication that its pronouncement will be modified, limited or restricted,,, Ibid. See
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U. S. 103 at 107,
59 S. Ct. 420 (1939).
9 Justice Holmes, in applying a New Jersey lower court's interpretation of a
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with less than state-wide jurisdiction, the federal court may be faced with a
conflict of decisions with no immediate prospect of having the conflict resolved
by the state supreme court. Ohio represents an extreme example of this situation,
since the Ohio Supreme Court is obligated to review only a few types of cases
which arise in the eighty-eight independent county courts of appeal. Where a
conflict exists in these courts, the federal court must assemble other data to
determine the state law.10 Thus the question what state decisions should be followed by the federal courts can hardly be defined by specific rules, but must be
decided on the basis of the circumstances surrounding each individual case.11
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state statute, said: "In view of the importance of that tribunal [supreme court] in New
Jersey, although not the highest court in the State, we see no reason why it should not
be followed by the Courts of the United States, even if we thought its decision more
doubtful than we do." Erie R. R. v. Hilt, 247 U. S. 97 at 100-101, 38 S. Ct. 435
(1918).
10 The federal judges cannot decide as they think the state supreme court ought
to decide, but as they think it would decide. McCormick and Hewins, "The Collapse
of 'General' Law in the Federal Courts," 33 ILL. L. REV. 126 at 136 (1938).
11 The principal cases have also been noted in 25 MINN. L. REv. 377 (1941);
27 VA. L. REV. 548 (1941); 9 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 458 (1941).

